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THE FUTURE OF DIRECT FINANCE: THE DIVERGING
PATHS OF PEER-TO-PEER LENDING AND
KICKSTARTER
Kathryn Judge∗

This Article explores why the technologies that have transformed
a range of industries by facilitating a dramatic rise in direct
transactions—as reflected in the rapid growth of eBay, Etsy, and
Airbnb, among others—have yet to similarly transform banking and
other modes of financial intermediation. Its primary focus is the
evolution of peer-to-peer (“P2P”) lending from a sector that promised
to bring similarly radical changes to financial intermediation to one
in which the relationship between the supplier and recipient of the
capital is increasingly attenuated. The analysis reveals a number of
market and regulatory forces that tend to favor intermediation and
work against direct finance when the exchange is purely financial.
Yet the Article also considers areas where direct finance appears to be
gaining more of a toehold. This examination reveals ways that
technology is increasingly enabling capital raising to be bundled
with other undertakings, like garnering publicity or gathering
information about the demand for a potential project. The analysis
suggests that when the exchange involves more than just capital,
direct finance may yet thrive, as individuals can bring attributes to
the table that intermediaries cannot readily replicate.
The conjecture that direct finance is most likely to be viable when
the provision of capital is part of a thicker bundle, while inherently
speculative, has ramifications for both theory and policy. Such a
development runs contrary to the prevailing wisdom that innovations
will lead to ever greater specialization and result in capital raising
being increasingly divorced from risk bearing and other
commitments. It also presents an interesting regulatory challenge, as
thicker bundles are more likely to raise policy and legal issues
traditionally addressed through disparate bodies of law and often
enforced by agencies with different aims and inclinations.

∗ Associate Professor of Law and Milton Handler Fellow, Columbia Law School.
The author is grateful to Mariana Pargendler, Fred Benenson, and participants
at the Wake Forest Law Review Symposium on the Future of Financial
Intermediation for helpful comments and conversations.
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Introduction
For centuries, the trend has been toward longer and more
complex intermediation chains in a wide array of contexts.1 The
growing length and complexity of intermediation chains were both
the byproducts and drivers of ever-greater globalization and
specialization. In recent years, however, there has been a shift in
the opposite direction.2 In a wide array of markets, suppliers and
consumers increasingly transact directly with one another. Many of
these developments have arisen from technological innovations that
reduce search costs and other hurdles to transacting, like verifying
information and negotiating the terms of a transaction. Airbnb,
Etsy, and their kin, for example, so lower transaction costs as to
enable a wide range of transactions to occur that would have been
unimaginable a mere decade ago. Bedrooms that previously sat
empty are now regularly occupied by a rotating cast of short-term
visitors; artisans can now make a living by reaching would-be
clients in faraway places.
Other forces that seem to be contributing to the rise of direct
transactions are changing consumer preferences and growing
appreciation for the ways that the nature of the intermediation
chain separating a consumer and a producer affects the nature of
the goods produced. For example, the dramatic resurgence of
farmers’ markets seems to reflect growing consumer demand for
foods that are locally and organically produced and consumer
appreciation of the fact that the vegetables available at a farmers’
market are different than those one can get at the average grocery
store.3
Shifting the focus to finance, one can find signs of both of these
trends. For example, the strong interest in P2P lending following
the 2007–2009 financial crisis seemed to be a byproduct of both new
technologies that could facilitate the ability of individual borrowers
and lenders to connect directly with one another and a heightened
distrust of banks. As explained in 2007 by the co-founder of a
leading P2P lending platform, Prosper, “there’s a growing trend
toward ‘people taking care of other people and a growing trend away

1. See Tamar Frankel, The Failure of Investor Protection by Disclosure, 81 U.
CIN. L. REV. 421, 427–30 (2013) (discussing the development of markets and
later banks as intermediation channels).
2. See infra Subpart I.A.
3. E.g., Stephen Vogel, Number of U.S. Farmers’ Markets Continues to
Rise, ECON. RES. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/chartgallery/detail.aspx?chartId=48561&ref=collection&embed=True&widgetId=373
73 (last updated Aug. 4, 2014) (“The number of farmers’ markets rose to 8,284
in 2014, up from 3,706 in 2004 and 1,755 in 1994.”). Etsy also embodies this
growing consumer trend toward direct transactions. See Hiroko Tabuchi,
Armies of Artisans, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2015, at B1.
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from reliance on corporations, banks[,] and large institutions.”4 He
viewed P2P lending as embodying the promise of this new era.
P2P lending has taken off, but in the process it has evolved to
become both more like and more reliant on the large financial
intermediaries it originally promised to supplant. Yet time has also
revealed other niches where true direct finance seems to be
flourishing. By exploring how and why P2P lending has evolved and
comparing that evolution to these other domains, this paper
explores the intertwined questions of the benefits financial
intermediaries provide and when direct interactions between the
suppliers and recipients of capital might be able to create value in
excess of the benefits that reliance on intermediaries can confer.
While speculative, the analysis here suggests that direct finance is
likely to thrive only when the exchange of capital—a good that is
fungible—is coupled with the exchange of other goods that are not—
such as feedback about the value consumers place on a proposed
project or the ability to support the creation of a public good not
easily financed through other mechanisms.
To separate hope from reality, it is necessary to begin by
considering the promise that P2P lending seemed to embody when it
first emerged. Early advocates depicted P2P lending as poised to
fundamentally transform multiple dimensions of the lending
process. With respect to the providers of capital, P2P held out the
promise of providing ordinary individuals the opportunity to invest
directly in unsecured loans, an activity that historically belonged
almost exclusively to banks. It was simultaneously heralded as
potentially expanding the pool of persons who could obtain credit,
enabling persons who might not readily qualify for a bank loan to
nonetheless obtain needed financing.5 In addition to altering the
providers and recipients of credit, P2P promised to transform the
nature of the relationship between these ends of the investment
chain, directly connecting retail lenders to those receiving their
funds.6
While the industry has grown dramatically in recent years, its
promise along each of these dimensions has diminished at an
equally rapid clip. The lender base has shifted from consisting
almost exclusively of individuals making modest investments to now
being dominated by large institutional investors.7 The individual
investors that remain increasingly rely on automated tools to

4. Pamela Yip, Person-to-Person Lending Is Networking Its Way Up,
DALL. MORNING NEWS, Dec. 10, 2007, at 1D, 2007 WLNR 24391872 (quoting
John Witchel).
5. See infra Subpart I.A.
6. See infra Subpart I.A.
7. Nav Athwal, The Disappearance of Peer-to-Peer Lending, FORBES (Oct.
14, 2014, 12:28 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/groupthink/2014/10/14/thedisappearance-of-peer-to-peer-lending/; see also infra Subpart I.B.
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allocate their funds, eliminating personalized review of the specifics
of each loan request.8 At the same time, platforms have become
increasingly discriminating in the borrowers they allow to seek
funds, and the metrics that platforms use to make this
determination are strongly correlated to those long used by banks
and other credit providers.9 Coupled with the changing lender base,
the result is that would-be borrowers are now evaluated in ways
akin to banks’ traditional underwriting processes, and the borrower
base consists largely of borrowers able to get credit
elsewhere. Finally, because of changes triggered by regulatory
concerns, P2P loans no longer create a direct relationship between
lenders and borrowers even when the capital comes from an
individual. Instead, lenders typically receive an unsecured claim
against the P2P platform, the value of which is set by reference to
the performance of the associated loan. Other changes in P2P
platforms are further blurring the bounds between these platforms
and traditional financial intermediaries.10 In short, P2P platforms
have become a link in complex, highly intermediated chains that
bear little resemblance to the potential they once embodied.
While far from conclusive, the evolution of P2P lending does not
bode well for the future of widespread direct finance. While the
changes in P2P lending may be due in part to efforts by established
intermediaries to use their informational and positional advantages
to entrench their positions in socially suboptimal ways, they may
also reflect the genuine gains that specialized intermediaries can
provide when the exchange is purely financial.11 Data-driven
algorithms have proven relatively effective at assessing borrower
creditworthiness and the limited data suggest that individuals are
unlikely to have any natural advantages in this process.12 The
regulatory intervention, while potentially poorly executed, was also
motivated by legitimate concerns about investor protection.11 The
changes in P2P lending may also indicate that when acting solely as
a borrower or lender, individuals care more about the expected cost
of a loan or return on their investment than they do about the
nature of their relationship to the party on the side.
This account is positive, not normative, and it does not discount
the potential for technology to transform and improve lending
8. See infra Subpart I.B.
9. See infra Subpart I.B.
10. E.g., Athwal, supra note 7 (stating that “institutions have managed to
infiltrate this once retail industry from every angle”—including taking board
seats on and investing in the major P2P platforms—and noting that
institutional investors now provide “80–90% of the capital deployed through
Prosper and Lending Club,” the two leading P2P platforms); see also infra
Subpart I.B.
11. See infra Part I.
12. See infra Subpart II.A.
11
See infra Subpart II.B.
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practices. While P2P lending has not changed intermediation in the
ways many first hoped, its rapid growth suggests that P2P
platforms can serve as a useful mechanism for credit creation. The
particular niches where P2P lending is thriving may well serve as a
roadmap of shortcomings in the way banks have approached
lending.13 Moreover, other financial intermediaries are finding
innovative and potentially productive ways to harness technology in
their underwriting procedures, and these efforts may well transform
the standards used to assess the creditworthiness of would-be
borrowers and expand the pool of eligible borrowers able to access
capital on terms they can afford.14 Nonetheless, these technologies
generally require resources to develop and thus tend to support the
use of intermediaries who can afford such investments.
Recognizng the market and regulatory forces favoring
intermediated finance does not, however, answer the question of
whether true direct finance has a future. In the same speculative
spirit that animates the rest of the analysis here, the paper
identifies and seeks to learn from niches where it appears to have
more potential. The focus here is on the success of the platform
Kickstarter, which connects artists and entrepreneurs with persons
who provide financing in exchange for non-financial rewards and a
nascent “locavesting” movement. While these two niches look quite
different from each other, and the various types of exchanges
facilitated by Kickstarter often bear little resemblance to each other,
they all share in common that the exchange involves something
more than the provision of capital.5 Those seeking funding may get
publicity, information about the demand for a project they are
considering, or the ability to connect with potential customers; those
providing the capital enjoy benefits like tangible goods that cannot
be acquired elsewhere or the intrinsic satisfaction that comes from
helping an artist create a public good. These nonfinancial
dimensions seem to be significant because they provide a new
reason for the involvement of individuals. While financial
intermediaries may have a superior capacity to assess the expected
financial return on a particular loan or to aggregate a diversified
investment portfolio, only individuals know the subjective value
they place on a particular product, and those values may vary
significantly from one individual to another. Similarly, a capitalraising process that entails having a thousand (or a million)
individual potential investors watch a video clip about a project can
generate significant publicity, enhancing the probability of success
in a way not easily replicated when the appeal is made solely to a
handful of institutional investors. These are just a couple of the
many ways that direct transactions that bundle capital raising with

13.
14.

See infra Subpart II.B.
See infra Subpart II.A.
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other undertakings might create value in ways that depend on the
direct nature of the exchange.
The notion that technological and other innovations may enable
new types of bundling, and that such bundling will at times be
optimal, has implications for both theory and policy. Conventional
wisdom has generally assumed that that technological and other
innovations will result in capital raising being increasing unbundled
from other commitments, and a number of historical developments
support this wisdom.16 The analysis here suggests that there may
be a second, simultaneous trend in the opposite direction. For
certain firms, bundling capital raising with other undertakings in
ways historically not possible may prove to be optimal.17 If the rise
of direct finance does indeed lead to greater bundling, this raises
some interesting policy challenges. In the United States and many
other jurisdictions, the agencies and experts that oversee the capital
markets overlap little with those who specialize in consumer
protection, and there may well be benefits of crowdfunding that are
not readily cognizable within any of the established
frames. Without purporting to offer any solutions, this article
concludes by identifying some of the challenges that lie ahead if
these predictions about where direct finance has the greatest
potential to flourish prove accurate.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the
evolution of P2P lending—the promise it embodied and the ways
reality has fallen short. Part II considers the reasons for this
evolution and what has been lost and gained in the process. Part III
addresses alternative domains where direct finance appears poised
to remain viable, focusing on Kickstarter and “locavesting.” Part IV
explores the theoretical and policy implications of these
developments.
I. The Evolution of P2P
A. The Promise
In an increasing number of domains, technology and changing
consumer preferences have resulted in the rise of new, and often
shorter, intermediation chains.18 For example, eBay now serves

16. See infra Subpart IV.A.
17. See infra Subpart IV.B.
18. Any person or entity that provides value by reducing a barrier to
transacting is, at least in part, functioning as an intermediary. See, e.g., Carl J.
Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & ECON. 141, 148 (1979); Robert
C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and Against “Coaseanism”, 99 YALE L.J. 611,
615 (1989). As reflected in the account of eBay, even many “direct” transactions
entail the use of one or more intermediaries; and, as reflected in the evolution of
P2P lending, the line between direct and intermediated transactions is far from
clear-cut. Nonetheless, this Article classifies transactions as direct when the
intermediary facilitates the transaction but does not stand between the persons
on both sides.
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functions once fulfilled almost exclusively by secondhand shops—
enabling persons to sell used but still useful goods and allowing
collectors and others to acquire products that are not available or
are more expensive in the market for new products. Rather than
just serving as a substitute for an established set of intermediaries,
however, eBay also enables thousands (if not millions) of
transactions that would never have been possible under the
traditional, more heavily intermediated mode of exchange. By
providing a platform that is easy for both sellers and buyers to
navigate, charging relatively low fees, and attracting large numbers
of both buyers and sellers, the site actually expands the pool of
would-be sellers and would-be buyers. Someone who would have
allowed knick-knacks to accumulate dust in an attic rather than
accept the low price that a secondhand shop would offer for the
goods might today find it worthwhile to sell them directly on
eBay. The volume of transactions conducted on eBay suggests that
the relatively modest effort required to sell goods, combined with the
ability to sell them at prices close to their best-use values, makes
selling goods on eBay a worthwhile undertaking for
many.19 Similarly, and relatedly, the ability to locate a large
number of goods that meet specified criteria with relatively little
effort appears to enable eBay to attract buyers who would not
otherwise peruse secondhand shops. eBay thus exemplifies the
ways that technology has evolved beyond enabling teams of
specialized intermediaries to move goods between disparate buyers
and sellers toward enabling a new mode of intermediation, in which
a platform operates primarily to connect buyers and sellers so that
they can enter into an exchange directly with one another.
The rise of P2P lending in the mid-2000s seemed to fit neatly
within this mold. A 2007 news article about this then-emerging
sector explained: “Prosper, based in San Francisco, aspires to do for
money what eBay did for your grandmother’s teapot collection—
create a person-to-person marketplace for consumer loans, and in
the process, turn average people into bankers.”20 As the co-founder
of Prosper, at that time the leader in P2P lending, explained that
same year:
When you go to Prosper, you are afforded the
opportunity to tell a large picture, to talk about why
you want the money, to tell your story, to invite your
friends to give you endorsements, which is different
from asking a friend to guarantee a loan . . . . You
19. E.g., eBay Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 50 (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1065088/000106508815000054/ebay201
410-k.htm (showing that the net revenue for the company’s marketplace
division was nearly $7 billion for 2014).
20. Annys Shin, Want to Loan Me Money? Here's a Picture of My Dog,
WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2007, at D1.
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have an opportunity to tell a more complete picture,
which leads to a better loan for everyone.21
Inherent in this description is an assumption that giving would-be
borrowers the opportunity to tell their stories in their own terms—
and giving would-be lenders the opportunity to read such stories and
assess competing requests—would fundamentally transform the
factors driving the process of determining who should receive credit
and on what terms.
The founder of Lending Club, which soon overtook Prosper as
the leading P2P platform in the United States, expressed similar
sentiments. He proclaimed, “The idea is to simplify the process and
operate a Web site where people who have money can lend directly
to people who need the money.”22 Popular press accounts of P2P
lending similarly highlighted its capacity to directly connect
individuals seeking funds with others looking to invest, and how
that might transform the process for both parties involved. A 2009
article, for example, opened by telling the stories of “Colin Nash, 35,
[who] was struggling with $12,000 in credit card debt,” and “Michael
Fisher, 24, [who] was looking for a new investment.”23 The article
explained that while “[t]he two men . . . had never met,” each had
his needs fulfilled when “Fisher loaned Nash $200” through
Prosper.com.24 As the story explained, while serving the economic
needs of lenders and borrowers, “Prosper’s . . . appeal . . . goes
beyond the bottom line” thanks to the “[p]hotos and personal
narratives [that] accompany borrowers’ requests.”25
Popular accounts and early research on the potential of P2P
lending often also echoed the claims made by Prosper’s founder
regarding the capacity for P2P lending to provide credit to those who
could not qualify for a loan from more traditional lenders. A 2009
news story, for example, illustrated how P2P lending platforms
worked by telling the story of Lara Sargent, a woman who “needed
about $15,000 to meet payroll and other expenses . . . as she
prepared to open a group foster home for boys.”26 Lara obtained the
needed financing from Lending Club “after her lender, Bank of
America, declined to extend her line of credit.”27
21. Yip, supra note 4.
22. Paul Donsky, Finding Credit: Social Lending Firms Broker Buddy
Loans, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 18, 2009, at D1, 2009 WLNR 995242; see also
John Gapper, The Lenders of the Revolution Look Familiar, FIN. TIMES, June 18,
2015, at 9 (explaining that “[t]he idea of these initiatives was to democratise
finance, taking on banks by removing a layer of complexity, costs and risk from
the system and replacing them with a set of Ebays for lending”).
23. Banks Watching Latest Online Trend: Strangers Asking Strangers for
Loans, TIMES TRENTON, Nov. 28, 2007, at A15, 2007 WLNR 24100300.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Donsky, supra note 22.
27. Id.
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Explaining how P2P lending might expand the pool of would-be
borrowers able to access credit, the San Francisco Federal Reserve
Bank began by recognizing that the use of “standardized
underwriting procedures and risk profiling algorithms,” combined
with other economies of scale, enabled financial intermediaries, like
banks,
to
“dramatically
increase[]
the
availability
of
credit.”28 Nonetheless, the primary beneficiaries have been
“[b]orrowers with standard risk profiles.”29 P2P lending, by
contrast, could enable credit to be allocated “on the basis of trust,
albeit trust between people that have only met in
cyberspace.”30 Another expert opined in 2008 that “P2P players
aren’t cutting the banks out of consumer lending . . . . They are
creating a new market for lending that the banking community
doesn’t play in efficiently.”31 Implicit, and sometimes explicit, in
these depictions of P2P lending is the idea that the wisdom of
crowds could, at least some of the time, do a better job than the
standardized underwriting criteria used by most banks.
Another defining feature of P2P, as originally conceived, is that
the architecture of the exchange was consistent with the emphasis
on the peer-to-peer nature of the exchange. As Lending Club
explained, “[f]rom the launch of our platform . . . until April 7,
2008 . . . our platform allowed members to purchase assignments of
unsecured member loans directly.”32 During this period, for each
loan that was made, the loan would be divided “into separate
promissory notes in amounts that matched the purchase
commitments from members for the particular member loan. At

28. Ian J. Galloway, Peer-to-Peer Lending and Community Development
Finance 1 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2009-06),
http://www.frbsf.org/community-development/files/wp2009-06.pdf.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2.
31. David Migoya, Help from Friends: Peer-to-Peer Lending Websites Fill
the Gap Left by Banks, DENVER POST, Nov. 16, 2008, at K1; see also Alan B.
Krueger, In Credit Crisis, Some Turn to Online Peers for Cash, N.Y. TIMES:
ECONOMIX
(Oct.
14,
2008,
9:17
AM),
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/in-credit-crisis-some-turn-toonline-peers-for-cash/?_r=0 (“P2P lending is a way to link lenders to borrowers
without intermediation by a bank, much the way that eBay matches buyers and
sellers of goods without a store in between.”); Amy B. Simpkins, Growing the
Pie: Nontraditional Lenders Aim to Increase Opportunities for Small Businesses,
BRIDGES,
Fall
2010,
at
6,
https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/publications/pub_assets/pdf/br/2
010/br_fall_10.pdf (“Nontraditional service providers are attempting to respond
to what they see as increasing market demand that is not being met by
commercial banks and the traditional model of small business lending.”).
32. LendingClub Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 55 (June 29, 2011),
https://www.lendingclub.com/fileDownload.action?file=10-K-MAR-312011.pdf&type=sf10k.
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closing, WebBank indorsed the promissory notes to [Lending Club],
and [Lending Club] assigned each promissory note to the applicable
member.”33 This meant that P2P loans were structured to provide
each lender a direct interest in each of the loans he or she had
chosen to back.
In highlighting the promise of P2P lending, it is critical to
distinguish the expectations regarding how it might transform
finance
from
the
first
generation
of
financial
disintermediation. Long before the recent trend toward direct
interactions, financial and technological innovations dramatically
altered the ways in which credit was created and
disseminated. Securitization, whereby loans typically are packaged
with others loans into a securitization vehicle against which one or
more classes of securities are issued, helped give rise to a shadow
banking system.34 Banks typically still originated the loans, but the
banks often sold those loans to securitization vehicles, and the
securities issued were used as collateral in a range of transaction
structures that collectively enabled maturity transformation, the
provision of liquidity, and other functions traditionally performed by
banks
to
be
performed
instead
through
the
capital
markets.35 Because banks are the prototypical financial
intermediary, the rise of a market-based system that replicated
many of the economic functions traditionally performed by banks
was seen as a move toward disintermediation.
This first-generation disintermediation was enabled and
accelerated by technological and other innovations. Yet the spirit of
this first generation of disintermediation was quite different than
that animating the rise of platforms like eBay, Airbnb, and those
facilitating P2P lending. Through a wide variety of mechanisms,
the shadow banking system created by the first generation of
financial disintermediation was deeply interconnected with the
regulated banking sector; there was significant overlap in the key
players in both worlds; and, while purporting to help consumers
obtain credit on better terms, it was never meant to empower
33. LendingClub Corp., Registration Statement under Securities Act of
1933
(Form
S-1)
79
(Oct.
7,
2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000119312511266917/d237605
ds1.htm#rom237605_22. WebBank is an Utah-chartered industrial bank that
works with both Prosper and Lending Club. See Andrew Verstein, The
Misregulation of Person-to-Person Lending, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 445, 476
(2011).
34. ERIK GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2013);
ZOLTAN POZSAR ET AL., FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., SHADOW BANKING: STAFF
REPORT
N O.
458,
at
1
(Feb.
2012),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf; Kathryn Judge,
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and
Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 659–60 (2012).
35. E.g., POZSAR ET AL., supra note 34.
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individuals or create more direct relationships between the
suppliers and recipients of capital.36 Rather, it typically led to much
longer and more complex intermediation chains that made the
relationship between the providers and suppliers of capital more
attenuated than the relationship that arises when a bank operates
in its traditional capacity.37
P2P lending, by contrast, initially promised a radically different
“second generation” of disintermediation. It was promoted by
Silicon Valley visionaries seeking to disrupt the prevailing regime
rather than players within that regime who sought to increase
profits by minimizing their regulatory burdens. As reflected in the
description above, P2P lending promised to be more like Etsy and
the farmers’ market.
B. Evolution
Since its inception less than a decade ago, P2P lending has
grown dramatically. In 2012, the total market reached just over $1
billion.38 By the end of 2014, Lending Club alone had originated $6
billion in loans through its platform, and Prosper had originated
more than $2 billion.39 P2P is also growing in other countries. In
the United Kingdom, for example, the volume of P2P loans doubled
in 2014 to more than £1.2 billion, and some suggest it is likely to do
the same in 2015.40 In conjunction with this growth, however, the
very notion of what constitutes P2P lending has evolved so
dramatically that serious questions are being raised about whether
the term “person-to-person” even remains an apt moniker for the
type of transaction these platforms are facilitating.
1. Suppliers of Capital
One of the most striking changes in P2P lending has been a
rapid increase in the proportion of capital provided by institutions
rather than individuals. As noted in a recent Wall Street Journal
article, one reason that the term “‘peer-to-peer’ lending” is “rapidly
36. Id.
37. Judge, supra note 34, at 660.
38. Chris Barth, Lend Thy Neighbor, FORBES, June 6, 2012, at 172.
39. J.D. Alois, Prosper: $493 Million in Peer to Peer Loans for Q3 2014,
CROWDFUND
INSIDER
(Nov.
20,
2014,
7:06
AM),
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/11/56564-prosper-493-million-in-peerto-peer-loans-for-q3-2014/; Theron Mohamed, Peer-to-Peer Lending: The Next
Gold
Rush?,
INV.
CHRONICLE
(Jan.
2,
2015),
http://www.investorschronicle.co.uk/2015/01/02/comment/chronic-investorblog/peer-to-peer-lending-the-next-gold-rushQE0RtVNsYyOPFZfJo8ud4I/article.html.
40. Ed Ballard, P2P Lending Gets a Fresh Boost from the Mainstream,
WALL
STREET
J.:
MONEYBEAT
(Jan.
30,
2015,
11:34
AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/01/30/p2p-lending-gets-a-fresh-boost-fromthe-mainstream/; see also Sebastian C. Moenninghoff & Axel Wieandt, The
Future of Peer-to-Peer Finance, ZEITSCHRIFT FUR BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTLICHE
FORSCHUNG, Aug./Sept. 2013, at 466, 474.
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heading into obsolescence . . . is that Prosper, like its peers, sells
roughly two-thirds of its loans to institutions.”41 According to
another source, a full 80% of the loans originated by Lending Club
or Prosper are funded by institutional investors.42 Describing the
evolution, one commentator recently observed that, while P2P
lending started out as “a place for small investors to loan to other
individuals, the field is now dominated by institutions, including
hedge funds.”43 As a result, the term “marketplace lending” is now
frequently being employed in lieu of P2P lending, as the term more
accurately describes the nature of the transactions these sites
typically facilitate.44
Large, sophisticated institutional investors who are deploying
capital that ultimately belongs to others look very different than 24year-old Michael Fisher, but institutionalization affects more than
just aesthetics. Perhaps the most striking difference between
institutional and individual investors is the tools they bring to bear
in assessing would-be borrowers. While Michael Fisher may have
been willing to, and may even have enjoyed, spending hours in front
of his computer reading the life stories of potential borrowers and
deploying money based on his instincts about how much he trusted a
particular borrower,45 institutional investors are unlikely to do the
same. Instead, they are deploying financial and technological
resources that, over time, might well enable them to screen
borrowers more effectively than the underlying platforms, leaving
many concerned that they will leave only lemons in their wake.46
The major P2P companies have recognized the potential for this
influx of new capital to transform their business model. In 2013, for
example, Lending Club asked a sovereign wealth fund seeking to
lend $250 million via its platform to spread that amount over two
years to minimize the distortions that might result.47 Nonetheless,
these scruples seem to have dissipated rather quickly, and it is not
clear that Prosper and Lending Club could maintain their
competitive edge in the field if they impose such limits.
41. Telis Demos, P2P Lender Prosper Buying Medical Loan Provider, WALL
STREET
J.:
MONEYBEAT
(Jan.
27,
2015,
2:15
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/01/27/p2p-lender-prosper-buying-medicalloan-provider/.
42. Jonathan Ford, Wall Street’s Siren Song Lures P2P Lenders into
Treacherous Seas, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2014, at 16.
43. Ianthe Jeanne Dugan & Telis Demos, For Peer Lending, a Change in
Financing, WALL STREET J., Oct. 21, 2014, at C3.
44. Id.
45. See supra Subpart I.A.
46. Cf. Jason W. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory
Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 281, 285 (2014).
47. Lending Club: Peer Review, ECONOMIST: SCHUMPETER BLOG (Jan. 5,
2013, 4:48 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/01/lendingclub.
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Looking beyond the source of the capital flowing into the two
leading lending platforms reveals further indicia that these types of
changes are underway and will affect other dimensions of the P2P
lending process. For example, leading members of the banking
industry are backing a start-up that links institutional investors
with P2P loan opportunities.48 Such additional intermediaries may
prove efficient, but they will necessarily use routinized mechanisms
for identifying creditworthy borrowers and will further attenuate
the relationship between the provider and recipient of capital,
reflecting the way that the changing lender base inevitably will also
transform who receives loans, how they are selected, and the
ultimate intermediation chain that results. These tendencies are
accentuated by two other developments, discussed further below—
that some loans which originated on P2P platforms are now being
packaged into securitization structures and that individual
investors increasingly rely on automated tools to select which loans
to fund.49
Another way that established financial intermediaries are
transforming the lender base and traditional P2P lending is by
setting up their own lending platforms. The most prominent
example is the announcement from Goldman Sachs that it intends
to create its own “marketplace lending” platform, in which it will use
its already advanced risk-assessment technologies to assess who will
receive a loan, and it will itself provide the capital to fund
it.50 While the actual ramifications of this development are not yet
known, commentators have already identified it as yet another sign
that the “peer” in peer-to-peer is likely a thing of the past.51
2. Recipients of Capital and Screening Process
In conjunction with the fluctuating lender base, there have been
notable changes in the borrower base and the mechanisms for
determining
which
would-be
borrowers
actually
receive
funding. These shifts are reflected in changes in Prosper’s business
model. When it first launched in 2006, 25% of those seeking funds
through Prosper were subprime borrowers—a figure that fell to just
5% by 2008.52 This was in part because Prosper’s original business
model allowed most people seeking credit to post a loan request, and
the role of determining whether to extend credit to a particular
borrower and on what terms was given to the original would-be
lenders reviewing the requests.53

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Dugan & Demos, supra note 43.
See infra Subpart I.B.3.
E.g., Gapper, supra note 22.
Id.
Richard Burnett, Need a Loan? Web May Come to Rescue, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 14, 2008, at A1.
53. Verstein, supra note 33, at 453.
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As originally designed, Prosper was thus meant to function in a
manner akin to Airbnb—as a relatively passive intermediary that
provides a technologically sophisticated platform through which
those supplying a good connect with those who want it. For Airbnb,
the good is a place to stay, while in P2P lending, the good is capital;
but the overall design was meant to be similar. Airbnb does not
engage in any ex ante screening with respect to those posting places
to rent or would-be renters. Anyone can post a listing and anyone
can make an offer to stay in a place so listed. The obligation to
distinguish the good from the bad and to assess the value
proposition of any particular good lies primarily in the hands of the
individual users. Airbnb facilitates this process in a number of
ways, but it is the parties to the transaction that ultimately must
decide whether they have received sufficient assurances that they
are willing to enter into an exchange with the party on the other
side.
While Prosper’s original business model was quite similar,
Prosper soon changed its approach. It turned out that while
individual lenders had some ability to screen would-be borrowers,
they were not particularly good at this task.54 As a result, lenders
on Prosper faced a relatively high default rate—16.5% on loans that
originated between November 2005 and October 2008.55
The process for determining who gets funded has since evolved
in a number of ways. Many of the changes have come from the
changing makeup and behavior of the lender base. An early study
revealed that while borrowers with poor credit histories constituted
the bulk of would-be borrowers in Prosper’s early days, even during
that period, such borrowers were substantially less likely to receive
a loan than borrowers with stronger credit histories.56 Another
early study found that the parties providing loans altered their
lending behavior over time—increasing their reliance on “hard” data
and reducing their willingness to have funding decisions swayed by
the full story beyond that data.57 As a result, Prosper made
corresponding changes in its business model—in response to the
greater demand for hard data, Prosper began to supply more of it.58

54. Michael S. Maier, Lending to Strangers: Does Verification Matter? 19–
20 (Jan. 15, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2379593 (prepared for the 2014
Canadian Academic Accounting Association Annual Conference).
55. Paul Katzeff, Pros, Cons of Peer-to-Peer Lending, INV. BUS. DAILY (June
12, 2009, 2:15 PM), http://news.investors.com/investing-mutual-funds/061209479444-pros-cons-of-peer-to-peer-lending.htm.
56. Gao Ruiqiong & Feng Junwen, An Overview Study on P2P Lending, 8
INT’L BUS. & MGMT. 14, 15–16 (2014).
57. Seth Freedman & Ginger Zhe Jin, Do Social Networks Solve
Information Problems for Peer-to-Peer Lending? Evidence from Prosper.com 25
(NET Institute, Working Paper No. 08-43, 2008).
58. Id.
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In addition to learning that their instincts about who might be a
credit risk were less reliable than hard data indicative of such, the
composition of would-be lenders and their processes for choosing
which loans to fund also had profound effects on the screening
process. Institutional investors and any new intermediaries that
they employ bring data and resources to the process of trying to
determine which would-be borrowers to fund. The rise of a new firm
created with the sole aim of helping such investors with this process
suggests that lenders will play a very active role in determining who
gets funded, but they will likely be using proprietary algorithms and
other mechanisms that necessarily reduce each request to a
standardized set of measures.59
The processes through which the remaining individual lenders
choose would-be borrowers have also evolved dramatically, and in
ways that further whittle back the number of people doing any type
of individualized analysis of the requests. The most significant
change here has been the introduction of new features on Prosper
and Lending Club that allow individual lenders to invest using an
automated feature that allows would-be lenders to identify the types
of loans in which they want to invest—effectively choosing how
much capital they want to allocate among the different risk
categories and then leaving the rest to the platform.60 In order to
encourage investors to use this automated feature, Lending Club
touts that “[w]ith just $2,500 you can spread your investment across
100 Notes” and “99.9% of investors that own 100+ Notes of relatively
equal size have seen positive returns.”61 It further highlights that
this feature provides lenders with “[a]ccess to the latest listed
loans,” while saving them time and requiring less effort to put their
capital to work.62 This approach is rational for most individual
investors, but by its nature it strips the process of determining
which borrowers get funded from any individualized review by
individual lenders.
When loans are funded in this way, the only screening process
used by the platform is to determine which would-be borrowers
actually get to post their requests. This is the second way that the
process has evolved dramatically over the short lifespan of P2P
lending. Both Prosper and Lending Club have become increasingly
stringent in this regard. Prosper has evolved from a passive
platform that allows any would-be borrower to make a request and
have that request reviewed by would-be lenders to an active filter
59. See infra Subpart II.B.
60. LENDINGCLUB, https://www.lendingclub.com/ (last visited Sept. 11,
2015); PROSPER, https://www.prosper.com/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
61. Understanding
the
Basics,
LENDINGCLUB,
https://www.lendingclub.com/public/build-portfolio.action (last visited Sept. 11,
2015).
62. Id.
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that allows only a limited portion of the requests to ever be seen by
would-be lenders . Moreover, the metrics it uses to do so strongly
resemble those long used by banks and traditional financial
intermediaries.63
Lending Club always played an active screening role, but it too
has become more stringent in its requirements over time. These
changes reduce the number of would-be borrowers who have the
opportunity to tell their whole story, as originally envisioned.64 It
also uses traditional metrics of creditworthiness in making these
determinations. For example, the primary metric that Lending Club
considers is a would-be borrower’s FICO score.65 Depending on that
score, the platform also considers the borrower’s debt-to-income
ratio; the number of credit accounts currently open; the current
balance on revolving accounts; whether the borrower has current or
recent delinquencies or other problems on his credit report; and the
length of the person’s credit history.66
As one would expect, as the platforms have altered the lending
process in ways that make it increasingly resemble the process used
by banks, the borrower base has evolved to consist primarily of
persons who could obtain credit, albeit at a potentially higher price,
from banks. As Lending Club touted to investors, at year-end 2014,
the average Lending Club borrower has a personal income of
$73,278, which the site suggests is the “top 10% of US population”; a
FICO score of 700 (which is a little below the national median of
723); and a lengthy 15.9 years of credit history.67 More generally,
the notion that P2P platforms will enable borrowers to be evaluated
on nontraditional metrics and service segments of the population
unable to access credit elsewhere has largely disappeared.
3. Relationship between Supplier and Recipient
A number of the changes already described have altered the
relationship between the suppliers and recipients of capital away
from the direct connection originally promised. In particular, the
institutional investors that now dominate the lending base are
typically investing capital for the benefit of others, thus creating at
least one additional node separating the ultimate suppliers and
recipients of capital.

63. See Freedman & Jin, supra note 57, at 33.
64. See LendingClub Corp., supra note 33, at 80–81.
65. Id. FICO scores are used by various lenders to evaluate the credit risk
of consumers. FICO Score, FICO, http://www.fico.com/en/products/fico-score
(last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
66. How It Works, LENDINGCLUB , https://www.lendingclub.com/public/howpeer-lending-works.action (last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
67. Earn
Solid
Returns,
LENDINGCLUB,
https://www.lendingclub.com/public/steady-returns.action (last visited Sept. 11,
2015); Lori Lamb, What Is a Good Credit Score?, CREDIT.ORG (Jan. 22, 2014),
http://credit.org/blog/what-is-a-good-credit-score-infographic/.
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At the same time, a massive change in the regulatory treatment
of P2P loans has brought about an even more radical change in P2P
loans, one that adds yet another node between the supplier and
recipient of capital. In 2008, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) deemed the notes embodying P2P loans to be
securities that needed to be registered under the Securities Act.68 In
order to comply with SEC regulations, Lending Club and eventually
Prosper agreed to register the notes as securities.69 Lending Club
provided the following simplified depiction of the new relationship
between the individual lenders and in the securities filings that
accompanied those offerings70:
[Flow Chart]
As this image reflects, today’s lenders have no direct
relationship
with
the
borrower
receiving
the
funds
provided. Rather, they have a claim only against the lending
platform. Moreover, while the value of that claim depends on the
performance of the reference loan, it is not secured by it. Thus,
when looking at the structure of the relationship—as opposed to the
expected return on the investment—it begins to look a lot more like
a traditional bank.
Another recent development that further transforms
intermediation chains created through P2P platforms is that such
loans are starting to be securitized.71 The trend started with
unrated securitization transactions but recently has expanded into
rated transactions. The P2P platform Social Finance, which
specializes in P2P student loans, has consummated two
securitization transactions rated by Standard & Poor’s,72 and in
February 2015, Blackrock sponsored a securitization transaction
backed by unsecured loans from Prosper that was rated by
Moody’s.73 The ability to obtain ratings further increases the types
of institutional investors that can invest in P2P-originated
loans.74 It is also likely to further accelerate the trend toward
68. Prosper Marketplace, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 8984, 2008 WL
4978684 (Sec. Exch. Comm’n Nov. 24, 2008).
69. Prosper originally challenged the designation, but ultimately lost,
forcing it to follow Lending Club. See id.
70. LendingClub Corp., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of
1933
(Form
S-1)
6
(June
20,
2008),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000089161808000318/f41480or
sv1.htm.
71. Joy Wiltermuth & Andrew Park, BlackRock Sets New P2P Consumer
Loan Benchmark, INT’L FIN. REV. (Feb. 5, 2015), 2015 WLNR 3627152.
72. SoFi Completes $303 MM ‘A’ Rated Securitization of Refinanced
Student
Loans,
YAHOO! FINANCE
(Nov.
10,
2014,
12:30
PM),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/sofi-completes-303-mm-rated-173039163.html.
73. Id.
74. Tracy Alloway, Bankers Work on Rated P2P Securitisations, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2014, at 20.
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reliance on standardized metrics in determining which borrowers
get funded, as standardization is key to making securitization work
and to enabling rating agencies to make the estimations of default
required to rate a security.
Connecting these developments to the changing lender base
reveals just how far P2P has strayed from the original vision. In the
majority of situations, there are now at least two permanent
nodes—the P2P platform or securitization vehicle and the
institutional investor—separating the individuals on both sides of
the chain. Additionally, both of these nodes pool capital from
multiple sources and invest it in multiple projects. While enabling
diversification and other benefits, this also further attenuates the
relationship between the individuals supplying the capital and the
individuals and small businesses receiving it.75
4.Looking Ahead
The changes in P2P lending in recent years have been rapid and
dramatic. Given the dynamism of the industry thus far, it may well
continue to evolve, potentially in unexpected ways. Nonetheless,
other indications suggest it is unlikely to return to the initial vision
as a forum for direct finance, free from the influence of banks and
other established financial intermediaries. Even beyond the
changes described above, other dimensions of the P2P industry
today further undermine its potential as a radical alternative to
Wall Street and the established banking regime. For example, John
Mack, the former head of Morgan Stanley, now serves on Lending
Club’s board of directors.76 Similarly, an increasing number of
banks are entering into partnerships with P2P platforms pursuant
to which the banks will sometimes refer customers to the platform
and other times acquire whole loans originated through the
platform.77 And many anticipate that the entry of Goldman Sachs
both will further transform what had been P2P and is also
indicative of the way P2P lending is evolving into something that
resembles the first generation of disintermediation and that will
evolve to become part of the shadow banking system.78 Thus, while
it is hard to know what the future will look like, P2P lending seems
75. See Judge, supra note 34, at 659.
76. LendingClub Corp., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of
1933
(Form
S-1)
101
(Aug.
27,
2014),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1409970/000119312514323136/d766811
ds1.htm.
77. Community Banks Face Risks, Opportunities in P2P Alliance, FITCH
RATINGS
(Feb.
17,
2015,
12:31
PM),
https://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/CommunityBanks-Face?pr_id=979915; Matt Scully, Banks Heat Up Bidding for Peer-toPeer
Loans,
ORIGINATION
NEWS
(Oct.
7,
2014,
4:52
PM),
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/origination/banks-heat-upbidding-for-peer-to-peer-loans-1042818-1.html.
78. E.g., Gapper, supra note 22.
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deeply entangled in long intermediation chains and increasingly
interconnected with the established regime. This period may very
well mark the death knell of the original promise of P2P lending and
the term itself may soon fade along with that promise.
II. Assessing the Evolution
Today, P2P lending bears little resemblance to the vision touted
less than a decade ago. Not surprisingly, many have been dismayed
by this failure to live up to its original potential. As one
commentator recently noted, “some see the institutional and bank
interest . . . as a cynical takeover by Big Bizness of a grass-roots
social movement that grew out of the rubble of the global financial
crisis and deep mistrust of the banks.”79 Yet the magnitude of these
changes, coupled with the dramatic growth of the industry, may
suggest that the value created by P2P arises from sources other
than those originally envisioned. This Part identifies some earlystage lessons—that may yet be proven wrong—based on the
evolution thus far. In light of the preliminary stage of this analysis
and the challenge of reaching any normative conclusions without
examining the broader landscape in which these changes are
occurring, the account is largely positive.
I suggest that the demise of the promise initially embodied in
P2P may indicate that the benefits that arise from direct
transactions in other domains are not present in the same way in
finance. Etsy and eBay succeed by connecting disparate buyers and
sellers who are exchanging idiosyncratic goods on which different
people place radically different subjective values. As explained by
Chris Anderson, these sites are part of a larger phenomenon
whereby the Internet is facilitating the rise of “new niche
market[s].”80 However, the same is not true for capital. Unlike a
secondhand clock or a handmade tea towel, capital is fungible. The
parties at each end of the spectrum rarely have any idiosyncratic
preferences—each wants to provide or receive capital on
competitive, risk-adjusted terms. This Part considers the ways that
the fungibility of capital may limit the transformative potential of
direct transactions when the exchange is a pure investment. Yet, as
the final Part addresses, direct finance may yet be viable, and could
even thrive, when the exchange has noninvestment dimensions, for
it is along these other dimensions that the presence of individuals is
most likely to have tangible benefits that cannot be easily replicated
at a lower cost by an intermediary.81
A. The Wisdom of Crowds v. the Resources of Experts
79. Keith Mullin, Peer-to-Peer Lending Takes Off . . . P2PABS Anyone?,
IFR ASIA (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.ifrasia.com/peer-to-peer-lending-takes-offp2pabs-anyone?/21188145.article.
80. CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS
SELLING LESS OF MORE 6 (2008).
81. See infra Part IV.
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There continues to be a lot of hype surrounding the potential for
crowdfunding to fundamentally transform debt and equity
markets.82 It is far too early to conclude that such hype is
unwarranted, but the transformation of the P2P market in recent
years casts doubt on whether crowdfunding is likely to be as
transformative as some suggest. In particular, one purported
benefit of crowdfunding, which was reflected in early depictions of
P2P, is that bringing the wisdom of crowds to the table might enable
the identification of meritorious undertakings that would otherwise
go unfunded.83 P2P, for example, was never intended to replace
banks, but it was heralded as likely to overcome shortcomings in the
standardized approaches banks employ for most small-scale lending
decisions. The assumption was that those approaches, precisely
because of their impersonal and routinized nature, had to overlook
some creditworthy borrowers, and the wisdom of crowds could
identify creditworthy borrowers that did not fit the traditional
mold. The subsequent evolution of P2P lending suggests otherwise:
the loans underperformed when individuals used their subjective
judgments of who seemed creditworthy.84 Lenders and platforms
quickly responded in ways that increased the performance of the
loans extended but undermined the degree to which the wisdom of
crowds played any role in the screening process.85
This does not undermine the possibility that technology and
data might succeed in identifying borrowers who are more
creditworthy than their credit scores and other traditional metrics
suggest. For example, there are a number of start-ups that are
experimenting with using new tools to assess whether a borrower is
likely to be a good credit risk. Rather than relying heavily on credit
scores, these start-ups are exploring ways that new information and
technology may be used to develop quite different metrics for
assessing a borrower’s propensity to repay.86 One such lender uses a
“software-based lending platform” which enables it to consider
“thousands of data points” and helps “to reduce the risk of fraud as
82. Ben Sisario, Pop Acts Go to Highest-Bidding City, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23,
2012, at C4; Nevin Martell, How to Buy a Little Slice of a Bakery, and Get More
Than Crumbs If It’s a Hit, WASH. POST (May 13, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/food/how-to-buy-a-little-slice-of-abakery-and-get-more-than-crumbs-if-its-a-hit/2015/05/13/7eab6f58-f811-11e4a13c-193b1241d51a_story.html.
83. Tanya Prive, What Is Crowdfunding and How Does It Benefit the
Economy,
FORBES
(Nov.
27,
2012,
10:50
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tanyaprive/2012/11/27/what-is-crowdfunding-andhow-does-it-benefit-the-economy/.
84. Elaine Moore & Tracy Alloway, Peer-to-Peer Lending: The Wisdom of
Crowds, FIN. TIMES, May 20, 2014, at 9.
85. Id.
86. Steve Lohr, Creditworthy? Let’s Consider Capitalization, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2015, at A1.
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well as borrower defaults.”87 The application process is also tailored
to the applicant. A borrower who wants money for a security
deposit, for example, is asked about when they are moving, where
they are moving to, and whether they are changing jobs in the
process.88 These lenders incorporate factors not previously
considered—like whether an applicant uses proper capitalization in
filling out a form—and alter the weight accorded to other factors
that have long played a role in assessing a borrower’s propensity to
repay a loan, such as missed payments in the past.89 Longer term,
big data may end up devising more accurate criteria for assessing a
person’s propensity to repay a loan and may transform underwriting
in the process. As the screening process improves, the costs of
borrowing should go down and the pool of eligible borrowers may
well expand. Nonetheless, it is resource-intensive research and
development that is allowing for this innovation, not the wisdom of
the masses.
Viewing these developments from a different angle, the fact that
P2P screening processes increasingly resemble banks’ underwriting
processes may suggest that banks actually do a pretty good job in
determining to whom to allocate credit. New types of expertise may
further refine and improve the process, but the wisdom of crowds
does not appear poised to fill in meaningful gaps, much less displace
established modes of intermediation.90 If anything, it is
intermediaries investing the money of others who will most likely be
able to justify the investments required to develop and refine this
new technology.
Another necessary coda is that bringing the wisdom of crowds to
credit decisions could have some undesirable consequences. At least
one study found that that when would-be black borrowers included a
picture with their loan request, they were less likely to have their
loans funded than would-be white borrowers with similar credit
ratings, and, conditional on receiving a loan, black borrowers were
likely to pay a higher rate of interest.91 In addition to finding what
the authors characterize as “significant racial discrimination,” the
87. How It Works, EARNEST, https://www.meetearnest.com/how-it-works
(last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
88. Personal Loans, EARNEST, https://www.meetearnest.com/personal-loans
(last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
89. Lohr, supra note 86.
90. The potential for the wisdom of crowds to outperform experts may be
greater with respect to other types of crowdfunding. See, e.g., Ethan R. Mollick
& Venkat Kuppuswamy, After the Campaign: Outcomes of Crowdfunding 13
(UNC
Kenan-Flagler,
Working
Paper
No.
2376997,
2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2376997; Ethan R. Mollick, Swept Away by the Crowd?
Crowdfunding, Venture Capital, and the Selection of Entrepreneurs 2 (Mar. 25,
2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2239204.
91. Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, What’s in a Picture? Evidence of
Discrimination from Prosper.com, 46 J. HUM. RESOURCES 53, 55–56 (2011).
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study found that lending platforms also “discriminate[] somewhat
against the elderly and significantly overweight, but in favor of
women and those that signal military involvement.”92 In sum, while
the evolution of P2P lending over the brief time examined herein is
far too limited of a data set from which to draw any strong
conclusions, it does suggest that there is reason to be skeptical that
crowdfunding—as opposed to other innovative approaches to
underwriting—is likely to be an effective mechanism for identifying
creditworthy borrowers overlooked by banks.
B. Banks—Good But Not Perfect
Even if P2P lending today bears little resemblance to the vision
initially promised, it has grown at a remarkable pace and seems
poised to continue its ascent. That rate of growth suggests that
there is real value being created by P2P lending relative to other
modes of intermediation. If not from the wisdom of crowds, the
question remains from where that value is coming. At least part of
the answer likely harkens back to the forces driving the first
generation of disintermediation and suggests that there may be
more similarities between P2P and securitization and its ilk than
was evident initially, even apart from the recent merging of the two
innovations.
One inescapable answer regarding value creation is regulation,
or rather the avoidance thereof. The United States and other
leading countries are in the midst of imposing a broad reform
agenda designed to create a more resilient financial system.93 The
2007–2009 financial crisis served as a reminder that weaknesses in
the financial system can have significant and devastating
consequences for the real economy. Many of these reforms have
targeted banks, particularly large ones.94 By increasing the amount
of capital banks must hold and imposing a number of other new
regulatory burdens on banks, the reforms may well strengthen the
banking system.95 Nonetheless, by imposing new costs on banks,
the reform agenda has the inevitable effect of increasing the value
that can be created by moving activity out of the highly regulated
banking sector. Other ways that P2P lending seems to be creating
value are by eschewing many of the operational expenses associated
with running a bank and expanding the types of investors who can
provide capital for personal and other loans.96
The rapid growth of P2P lending may also suggest that it is
meeting consumer demands that were not adequately addressed by
92. Id. at 55.
93. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Moore & Alloway, supra note 84.
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traditional banks. One of the primary reasons that borrowers seek
money from P2P platforms is to pay off credit card debt.97 The
credit card market is competitive, and credit card companies
regularly seek to attract new clientele—or expand the business they
receive from current, creditworthy clients—by allowing clients to
transfer balances from other credit cards and even to receive favored
interest rates on those balances.98 Nonetheless, the terms banks
offer to entice clients to transfer existing balances typically also
include other features that can substantially increase the effective
cost of their credit, particularly if a borrower is not sufficiently
discerning.99 That such structures are so commonplace suggests
that even though the credit card market may be highly competitive,
competition has led to terms that are attractive along dimensions
that are most likely to be salient to potential borrowers but has not
necessarily resulted in lowering the cost of funds in the manner one
might expect based on a simplified model of competition and credit
creation.100
Viewed in these terms, P2P loans may offer a different type of
product to consumers, one for which there appears to be significant
demand. Paying off an outstanding credit card balance with a threeyear or five-year loan from a P2P platform avoids any such
complications and typically enables the borrower to pay a rate of
interest that is significantly lower than the interest rate she had
been paying on that balance.101 Particularly for borrowers who have
been burned, or know others previously affected, by failing to be
sufficiently wary when using a balance transfer to pay off credit
card debt, this may be quite attractive. Lending Club seems to
recognize that the structure may be part of what makes P2P loans
attractive, as it advertises to would-be borrowers the fact that

97. Ann Carrns, Online Lending Sites Offer Alternative to Traditional
Borrowing,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
1,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/02/business/online-lending-sites-offeralternative-to-traditional-borrowing.html.
98. Sumit Agarwal et al., The Age of Reason: Financial Decisions over the
Life-Cycle with Implications for Regulation 13 (Oct. 19, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=973790.
99. Id. (describing one of the most common structures used to encourage
borrowers to transfer balances, how borrowers can end up overpaying, and how
long it takes different borrowers to figure out the optimal strategy).
100. See Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act
and Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 978–79 (2012).
101. According to Lending Club, “[b]orrowers who used a personal loan via
Lending Club to consolidate debt or pay off high interest credit cards report in a
survey that the interest rate on their loan was an average of 7.0 percentage
points lower than they were paying on their outstanding debt or credit
cards.” Pay
Off
Credit
Cards,
LENDINGCLUB,
https://www.lendingclub.com/public/credit-card-loans.action (last visited Sept.
11, 2015).
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lending clubs have “[f]ixed rates and payments with no hidden
fees.”102
Whether there are other gaps in the provision of credit by
traditional banks that P2P might be able to fill remains to be
seen. There have been long-standing debates about whether banks
do an adequate job of providing loans to small businesses, and many
viewed this potential deficiency as another area where P2P lending
might be primed to thrive. The data available, while preliminary,
cast doubt on this proposition.103 A recent study from economists at
the Federal Reserve using data from Lending Club found that small
business loans were less likely to get funded and more than twice as
likely to perform poorly if funded than other types of loans.104 P2P
lending appears to be gaining traction in providing loans for medical
needs—a niche that seems to have been serviced, at least in part,
outside the banking system even before the entry of P2P.105
The aim here is not to provide an exhaustive account of where
P2P lending is most likely to succeed but rather to note that the
ways in which it has started to emulate traditional financial
intermediaries may be a testament to the efficiency of their
underwriting procedures. While the particular niches in which P2P
lending is growing most rapidly may serve as a roadmap to those
sectors of the credit market that have not been as well served by
banks and other established intermediaries, the data available
support the notion that banks seem to do a pretty good job with
screening and credit-allocation decisions.
C. Intermediation Chains Not Easily Shortened
Another implication of the rapid and dramatic changes in P2P
lending is that long, complex intermediation chains seem unlikely to
disappear anytime soon. Nor do the established players, from banks
to institutional investors, seem likely to be displaced. While these
firms were not the drivers of the second generation of
disintermediation, they have quickly infiltrated and changed the
course of the revolution it embodies in the process. This is likely
due in part to intermediary influence—that is, the tendency and
capacity of entrenched intermediaries to distort the processes

102. Personal
Loans,
LENDINGCLUB,
https://www.lendingclub.com/public/personal-loans.action (last visited Sept. 11,
2015).
103. See TRACI L. MACH ET AL., PEER-TO-PEER LENDING TO SMALL BUSINESSES
(Fed. Res. Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2014-10,
2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2014/201410/201410pap.pdf.
104. Id. at 5–7.
105. Demos, supra note 41; see also Mark Calvey, Lending Club Debuts
Education and Patient Financing Services, S.F. BUS. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2014, 5:42
PM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/2014/11/lending-clubconsumer-finance-education-loans.html.
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through which institutions evolve in self-serving ways.106 But there
also appears to be a variety of less troubling forces operating to
impede a shift to direct finance.
One factor is that institutional investors enjoy genuine
informational and resource advantages over retail investors. As just
discussed, it is not yet clear whether the wisdom of crowds can
outmatch the advantages enabled by the scale and scope enjoyed by
large institutional investors.107 Screening, monitoring, and
diversification are just a few of the many important and otherwise
costly services that intermediaries can provide.
The regulatory regime and the policy concerns that animate it
also tends to favor intermediation, as reflected in the ways the SEC
effectively mandated that P2P lending platforms remain as a node
separating those providing and receiving capital through P2P
loans. Some informed observers have critiqued the changes the SEC
mandated with respect to P2P loans. Professor Andrew Verstein, for
example, has persuasively argued that the SEC’s approach to
regulating P2P lending imposes an “ill-fitting framework” on the
industry, and he has identified numerous shortcomings in its
approach.108 The analysis here supports concerns that the SEC may
be poorly suited to address many of the challenges posed by direct
finance.109 Nonetheless, the investor protection concerns that
underlie the SEC’s approach are legitimate and are not going to
disappear anytime soon.110
D. Looking Ahead
A critical factor underlying the evolution of P2P is that both
would-be lenders and borrowers are entering into the transaction for
primarily financial reasons. Borrowers want a lower interest rate or
a different loan structure than they can readily obtain elsewhere;
whether the money comes from an institutional investor or an
individual matters less than its availability and terms. Similarly,
despite at times being depicted in more romantic terms, the short
history suggests that most lenders provide capital for such loans
because they expect an attractive rate of return on a risk-adjusted
basis. The positive account here suggests that when an exchange is
only about capital, the many advantages enjoyed by established
intermediaries
will
make
them
difficult
to
displace
completely. Capital is fungible. Moreover, even when new modes of
intermediation arise, the advantages that established players and
modes of intermediation enjoy may well enable them to infiltrate the
new domain.
106.
(2015).
107.
108.
109.
110.

Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 577
See Parsont, supra note 45, at 321–23; see also supra Subpart II.A.
Verstein, supra note 32, at 488.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
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Yet it does not follow that the move to direct transactions
observable in other settings is destined to bypass capital
raising. Stepping back from the focus on P2P lending to take in the
broader landscape reveals that this movement is starting to
infiltrate the process of raising capital in ways that may prove more
enduring. Examining the success of Kickstarter and the ascendant
“locavesting” movement, this next Part suggests that direct
transactions may yet thrive. The key distinguishing factor is likely
to be whether the exchange entails at least some nonfinancial
dimensions.
III. Looking Beyond P2P
The analysis thus far has focused almost exclusively on P2P
lending. Its evolution may well have lessons for crowdfunding more
generally, but there are limits to what can be inferred from one
domain of this broader phenomenon. The importance of looking
beyond P2P to develop a more balanced assessment of the viability
of crowdfunding is reflected in signs that the wisdom and
participation of crowds may have value in some settings. For
example, a recent study on the outcomes of equity crowdfunded
firms in Europe found that “the firms on average experience a peak
in both sales and sales growth during the year after the campaign,
and that this tends to be positively impacted by a larger number of
investors through the campaign.”111 The study further found that
“the campaign on average helped the firms to gain press attention
and publicity.”112 In other words, equity crowdfunding may be
beneficial for firms and may also provide benefits to retail investors
in ways that go beyond the pure investment dynamics of the
exchange. Without purporting to provide a comprehensive account,
this Part focuses on a few areas where crowdfunding appears to be
gaining traction in order to consider the limits to the assessment
here that true direct finance is unlikely to displace established
financial intermediaries and long, complex intermediation chains
anytime soon.
A. Kickstarter
Among the most successful crowdfunding platforms is
Kickstarter.113 Billing itself as “a new way to fund creative
projects,” Kickstarter enables filmmakers, musicians, artists,
videogame designers, and other types of entrepreneurs to propose

111. Maxence Décarre & Emelie Wetterhag, Uncovering the Outcomes of
Equity Crowdfunding: Post-Funding Outcomes of Equity Crowdfunded Firms in
Europe 6 (Dec. 8, 2014) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Stockholm School of
Economics), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2545276.
112 Id. at 7.
113. E.g., Stephen Heyman, Keeping up with Kickstarter, INT’L N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2015, at 11. For an overview of Kickstarter and crowdfunding more
generally, see Ethan R. Mollick, The Dynamics of Crowdfunding: An
Exploratory Study, 29 J. BUS. VENTURING 1 (2014).
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“projects, big and small,” and it has helped entrepreneurs finance
projects ranging from a theatrical production114 to a new line of yoga
clothing.115 A typical proposal features some information about the
entrepreneur and the proposed project, but also includes an array of
other material—like pictures, videos, and stories—intended to
capture the spirit of the proposal and otherwise engage with wouldbe funders.
There are many similarities between Kickstarter and the
original paradigm for P2P lending. The platforms in both settings
facilitate connections between would-be suppliers of capital and
those seeking capital. In both settings, technology plays a critical
role connecting persons who may be geographically and otherwise
quite distant. Platforms in both settings allow would-be funders to
search for particular types of projects or would-be borrowers and to
choose the size of the commitment that they are willing to
make. Similarly, funding of a Kickstarter project, just like the
funding of a P2P loan, is contingent upon the project receiving
commitments that satisfy the amount requested, and most
commitments cover only a small portion of the amount requested, so
it is only when there is broad support for a project or loan that it
gets funded.
Yet there are also notable differences between Kickstarter and
P2P lending. Most importantly, in contrast to P2P lending and
many other forms of crowdfunding, the persons providing the capital
to support a project do not get any economic rights in exchange for
that capital, nor do they have any rights with respect to the
project. Rather, funders are typically provided a promise of an
opportunity or good related to the project being funded along with
any utility they may derive from feeling like they are part of the
creative process or supporting the person or project they have
committed to support.116 The opportunities and goods that funders
of various levels will receive are established by the entrepreneur
when he or she proposes a project and are often closely tethered to
the proposed undertaking. Other motivations, according to one
serial funder, include “providing encouragement” and “trying to help
someone bring their project to life.”117 Kickstarter similarly
114. The
Grand
Paradise,
KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/thirdrailprojects/the-grand-paradise (last
visited Sept. 11, 2015).
115. Go Commando with Dear Kate Yoga Pants, KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1527229560/go-commando-with-dear-kateyoga-pants (last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
116. For this reason, Kickstarter and its kin are deemed “reward-based
crowdfunding” in the relevant literature. See, e.g., Décarre & Wetterhag, supra
note 111, at 6.
117. Philip Reed, Five Reasons I Back Kickstarter Projects, BATTLEGRIP.COM
(Apr. 9, 2013), http://www.battlegrip.com/five-reasons-i-back-kickstarterprojects/.
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highlights that while some funders are “motivated to pledge by a
project’s rewards,” others are motivated by aims like “supporting a
new effort from someone they’ve long admired,” and, in each
instance, a commitment of support is a way to “pledg[e] . . . support
to a creative idea that [the funder] want[s] to see exist in the
world.”118
The range of projects is far more diverse and colorful than the
range of loan opportunities one typically can find on a P2P platform,
and the overall process of reviewing options is a very different
experience for the would-be Kickstarter funder than the would-be
P2P lender. Reviewing potential loans on Lending Club entails
sorting through a lot of numbers, letter credit ratings assigned by
the platform, and some additional information, which today tends to
be quite limited and dry. The Kickstarter interface, by contrast,
takes a user into a visually rich and stimulating environment full of
videos, pictures, and stories. This is relevant to the analysis here as
it highlights that the service Kickstarter is providing to both
funders and entrepreneurs has dimensions that have little to do
with the capital exchanged. In order to explore further, it is helpful
to consider some of the types of projects that get proposed.
Some projects are small- to medium-scaled endeavors in the
arts. For example, “The Being of Nothingness Project” is a proposal
for a “7.20 min dance film of the 2013 creation Being and
Nothingness (Part 1), set on Prima Ballerina Greta Hodgkinson and
choreographed by Guillaume Côté.”119 Supporting material included
a video with a discussion by the creators, dance clips, and reviews of
the dance when it was performed live. Funders providing $10
received “THANKS!” from the creators, while those providing $200
were treated to a personal “thank you” on the creator’s Twitter
handle, unlimited viewing access to the video upon release,
recognition as a ‘Supporter’ in the film credits, and “an autographed
pointe shoe from Greta Hodgkinson.”120 The project, which aspired
to raise at least CAD $14,900, exceeded its goal and raised CAD
$19,408.121
In these instances, Kickstarter is making patronage of the arts
accessible even to those with modest amounts to give while also
providing supporters with preferential access to the project created
or its creators. From the perspective of the creators, obtaining
funding in this way can also serve as a marketing device, a
118. Kickstarter
Basics:
Kickstarter
101,
KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/faq/kickstarter%20basics (last visited Sept.
11, 2015).
119. The
Being
and
Nothingness
Project,
KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/740176627/the-being-and-nothingnessproject/description (last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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mechanism to broadcast information about the undertaking to a
receptive audience and to build enthusiasm for the project in the
process.122 Particular features of the Kickstarter site, like the
ability of a funder to broadcast through various forms of social
media her decision to fund a project, amplify these effects, enabling
the funders to advertise their patronage while simultaneously
spreading
information
about,
and
endorsing,
the
project. Kickstarter also serves as a valuable mechanism for
creators to gauge the level of interest in a proposed project. When a
project fails to achieve its minimum funding goal—which precludes
the creators from receiving even the funds that have been offered—
the entrepreneurs learn valuable information about the degree of
interest in the project. While it may be disappointing for a creator
to learn that there is little interest in the short documentary he was
hoping to make with funds from Kickstarter, the filmmaker may be
well served to learn this before undertaking the project than after
investing his own money and time in it.
At other times, the exchange is more akin to a sale, contingent
upon the project being funded and the good created. For example,
when DrinkTanks, a small company in Bend, Oregon, that aims to
“revolutionize personal beer containers,”123 sought to create a new
product that would be the “world’s largest growler & personal keg,”
it turned to Kickstarter.124 To encourage would-be funders to give
money to support the development of the proposed 128-ounce
Juggernaut Growler, the company included a video featuring the
company’s founder and CEO, in a plaid shirt and baseball cap,
explaining his vision and drinking beer with friends. The company
also promised different types of goods depending on the level of
support provided. Funders providing twenty-five dollars would
receive their choice of a branded baseball cap or fitted tee, while
early funders who provided ninety-nine dollars or more received a
Juggernaut Growler in their choice of “12 stylish finishes” along
with a Kegulator that could be attached to provide carbonation.125
While the nature of the exchange for these types of projects is
more akin to a retail sales transaction than patronage of the arts,
the benefits that inure to both the funder and the entrepreneur go
beyond the exchange of capital in similar ways. The entrepreneur
gets feedback about the market demand for the proposed project
Venkat Kuppuswamy & Barry L. Bayus, Crowdfunding Creative Ideas: The
Dynamics of Project Backers in Kickstarter 26 (UNC Kenan-Flagler, Working
Paper
No.
2013-15,
2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2234765.
123 About Us, DRINKTANKS, http://www.drinktanks.com/about-us/ (last visited
Sept. 11, 2015).
124 DrinkTanks Offers the World’s Largest Growler & Personal Keg,
KICKSTARTER,
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/584321487/drinktanksoffers-the-worlds-largest-growler-and-p (last visited Sept. 11, 2015).
125. Id.
122
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while also generating publicity and demand when a project is
positively received. Similarly, the funders usually commit at levels
that allow them to obtain prototypes or other tangible goods related
to the project proposed. Just as in other sales transactions, the
commitments likely indicate that the subjective value that the
funder places on the good exceeds the amount he is willing to
commit to the undertaking. The transaction is still capital raising—
the creator is seeking funds in order to pursue a particular project—
and because it is occurring at a point in time before the good is
actually created, the person providing the funds is necessarily
assuming a degree of risk that would not be present in a retail
transaction. Yet the process of raising capital is bundled with an
exchange of other goods that are also valuable to the creator and the
funder. Also notable is that the party providing the capital does not
receive an equity or debt claim in the firm or undertaking; the
funder receives something in exchange, but not the right to a
financial return on the capital she provides.
The importance of Kickstarter’s capacity to incorporate capital
raising into a thicker exchange that entails nonfinancial components
is reflected in the increasing tendency for entrepreneurs who may
have had access to financing through other avenues to instead raise
funds through Kickstarter. For example, a recent study of hardware
start-ups suggests that Kickstarter may be starting to function as a
complement to the angel investors or venture-capital firms that
entrepreneurs in this space traditionally relied on for
financing.126 The study found that using Kickstarter enabled such
firms to delay seeking capital from angels or venture capitalists,
while also garnering excitement and demonstrating their promise to
potential investors.127 Based on interviews with more than eighty
entrepreneurs who raised funds on Kickstarter, the author
concluded that most entrepreneurs believed that “the biggest
takeaway they had was in fact the [funders].”128 This is because
those funders and others who contemplate supporting a project
provide “comments, feedback, and FAQs” that can “shift[] and
shape[] the entire direction of the company going forward.”129 From
126. Matt Ward, Why Hardware Startups Should Screw VC and Go
Straight to Crowdfunding, VENTURE BEAT (Nov. 29, 2014, 10:55 AM),
http://venturebeat.com/2014/11/29/why-hardware-startups-should-screw-vc-andgo-straight-to-crowdfunding/.
127 Id.
128. Id.; see also How Much Venture Capital Are Kickstarter and Indiegogo
Hardware
Projects
Raising?,
CB
INSIGHTS
(Aug.
11,
2014),
https://www.cbinsights.com/blog/crowdfunded-venture-capital-hardware/
(finding that “Kickstarter-backed hardware projects have raised over $268M”
from venture capitalists and that 9.5% of hardware startups raising at least
$100,000 through Kickstarter or Indiegogo subsequently get venture capital
funding).
129. Ward, supra note 126.
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the perspective of the author, this feedback and the changes it
triggers is “invaluable and it’s something no venture-capital firm
can replicate.”130
B. “Locavesting”
Another domain where direct connections between the suppliers
and recipients of capital are gaining some traction is an activity
known as “locavesting.” Building on the “shop local” movement, the
“invest local” movement encourages individuals to preferentially
deploy capital to fund local businesses. As explained by Amy
Cortese, who coined the term, “[t]he idea is that, by investing in
local businesses, rather than, say, a faceless conglomerate, investors
can earn profits while supporting their communities.”131 Like the
original paradigm of P2P lending, the movement arose in part to
appeal to persons with capital to invest who were “[t]ired of . . . Wall
Street,” and the aim was to provide investors at least some return
on their capital.132 Yet, once again, there are differences.
Locavesting was always about providing funders with
something more than just an economic return on investments. It
also sought to facilitate the opening and ongoing operation of
independent businesses, to forge stronger relationships between
businesses and members of the communities they serve, to promote
economic activity in a region, and to otherwise promote community
engagement.133
While some examples of locavesting arise from person-to-person
interactions, technology is also playing a role in expanding
opportunities for both would-be funders and borrowers. For
example, residents of Seattle who want to support local businesses
can now do so through Community Sourced Capital, a crowdfunding
platform through which residents can make loans to local
130. Id. (noting that crowdfunding through a site like Kickstarter can create
“a community of incredibly supportive and innovative early adopters”); Jing
Cao, How VCs Use Kickstarter to Kick the Tires on Hardware Startups,
BLOOMBERG
BUS.
(Aug.
11,
2014,
11:03
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-08-08/how-vcs-use-kickstarter-to-kickthe-tires-on-hardware-startups.html (“A crowdfunding campaign allows a VC to
‘talk to customers, track return and/or failure rates, and then fund expansion
with real data,’ said Barry Schuler, managing director at DFJ Growth.”).
131. Amy Cortese, Locavestors, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 12, 2008, at 63.
132. AMY
CORTESE,
http://www.amycortese.com/Amy_Cortese_homepage.html (last visited Sept. 11,
2015).
133. Anne Field, ‘Locavesting’ Meets Crowdfunding Meets Social
Entrepreneurship,
FORBES
(Nov.
24,
2013,
10:07
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2013/11/24/locavesting-meetscrowdfunding-meets-social-entrepreneurship/; Danielle Sacks, “Locavesting”:
Investing in Main Street Instead of Wall Street, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 3, 2011,
12:40 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/1771064/locavesting-investing-mainstreet-instead-wall-street (interview with Amy Cortese).

DIRECT FINANCE 9.18.15.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

132

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

9/18/15 3:51 PM

[Vol. XX

enterprises.134 Would-be lenders commit to support a project at a
level between $50 and $250 and would-be borrowers can seek loans
of up to $50,000.135 In its first year, the site raised “$175,000 in
loans for 12 businesses from over 1,000 community lenders.”136
Connecting to the broader picture, the assumption underlying
locavesting is that many individuals with capital to deploy place a
positive subjective value on living in a community with particular
attributes or derive pleasure from feeling like they are helping
particular types of businesses. Some individuals may prefer to live
in a community where there are a lot of small businesses and
relatively few conglomerates. Apart from moving, which may be
quite costly and even impossible depending on a person’s
circumstances, these are not goods that individuals can easily
acquire or support in isolation. Expressing these preferences
through a willingness to accept a significantly lower economic
return on capital invested may thus be a compelling combination for
some investors. While there are intermediaries, like Community
Sourced Capital and local stock exchanges, that play a role in
connecting the supplier and recipients of the capital, the nature of
the relationship is premised on geographic proximity and a greater
effort
to
promote
a
sense
of
connection
within
a
community. Relatively short intermediation chains are thus central
to making the design work. Whether locavesting will take off and
how it might evolve in the process remains to be seen, but it does
appear to be another area where direct finance may be gaining a
foothold.
IV. The Future of Direct Finance
All of the different transactions described here, along with a
host of others, fall under the general rubric of crowdfunding. In
each, the provision of capital remains central—individuals (and now
others) are providing capital to other individuals or small-scale
enterprises as part of an agreement that provides that they will
receive something in exchange, and the probability that the person
will actually receive the good promised often depends on the
capacity of the entrepreneur to successfully undertake the project
proposed. Yet there are significant differences between P2P lending
on one hand, and Kickstarter and locavesting on the other. P2P is
primarily a financial exchange. While early adopters may have
derived some nonpecuniary utility from knowing that they were
providing a loan to someone who they felt deserved it, the rapid
evolution of P2P lending and the increasing reliance of even
individual investors on automated tools when making loans suggest
that the nonfinancial dimensions were far outweighed by the
financial ones. The same is not true with respect to the typical
134.
135.
136 Id.

Field, supra note 132.
Id.
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Kickstarter or locavesting opportunity. Locavesting is based on the
premise that the persons providing capital are willing to forego some
return or assume greater risk because that person providing the
capital derives some nonpecuniary utility from the exchange. The
nonpecuniary dimensions are even more central to the exchanges
that occur through Kickstarter, as even when the provider of capital
expects something tangible in exchange for the capital provided,
that person has no economic stake in the firm or project he is
helping to fund. That Kickstarter has been so successful suggests
that there may be advantages to packaging the provision of capital
in a bundle with these other goods and services. Similarly,
locavesting demonstrates the ways that bundling the provision of
capital with other idiosyncratic preferences may enable retail
investors to express preferences and acquire goods that are not
readily accomplished in other ways. This Part very briefly considers
the theoretical and policy implications of the demise of P2P lending
alongside the success of platforms like Kickstarter.
A. Theoretical Implications
While crowdfunding may seem like a new trend, it has deep
roots. People loaning money to people is far from a new
phenomenon; neither is raising capital from persons who have a
stake in an undertaking apart from the financial returns on their
investment. As Henry Hansmann and Mariana Pargendler have
shown in a wonderful account on the evolution of shareholder voting
rights for many late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century
corporations, “the principal shareholders were also the firm’s
principal customers.”137 This is because “local merchants and
farmers were apparently the most effective source of capital” at the
time.138 Yet, Hansmann and Pargendler’s account also suggests that
legal and other innovations during the intervening years help
explain the decline of customer-owned firms and the prominence of
investor ownership today.139 The overall account, which is not
limited to the United States, suggests a progressive movement
toward “business corporations” in which “shareholders . . . are
generally investors whose primary, and typically only, interest in
the firm is to obtain a financial return.”140
Recent theory suggests that ongoing innovations may result in
even more extreme unbundling. For example, Charles Whitehead
and Ronald Gilson suggest that “the continued development of
increasingly complete capital markets, in which working capital can
be separated from risk capital and discrete slices of risk can be
137. Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of
Shareholder Voting Rights: Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123
YALE L.J. 948, 951 (2014).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 991–1001.
140. Id. at 1007.
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separately transferred, pooled, and shared among market
participants, has called . . . into question . . . the traditional need for
residual shareholders, whose risk exposure spanned the
marketplace.”141 The literature thus largely highlights the ways
that increasingly robust legal institutions and financial innovations
may enable ever-greater splicing of interests, which in turn should
lower the cost of capital by allowing persons to hold just the slice
that they are best suited to provide. In short, the assumption has
largely been that innovation should enable ever-greater
specialization, and that will benefit all involved.
The growth of Kickstarter as a funding model suggests that
these analyses, while not wrong, are incomplete. They accurately
highlight the way that financial, technological, and institutional
improvements enable interests to be separated into ever-more
narrow components. And it will often be optimal in light of these
developments for rights and obligations previously bundled together
to be unbundled and allocated in ways that optimize the different
interests and institutional capacity of an ever-growing array of
stakeholders. In some ways, Kickstarter represents a point further
along this continuum—entrepreneurs often go to Kickstarter to
obtain capital for projects that they likely will not undertake
without the fresh capital, and the ability to offer nonfinancial
commitments in return may well enable fundraising that would not
have occurred otherwise. Yet among the reasons for an
entrepreneur to use Kickstarter in lieu of an alternative mode of
raising capital is that the site allows her to do more than just raise
capital. By seeking capital through a channel that is designed to
simultaneously further other aims, like enabling the entrepreneur
to learn more about the demand for her proposed undertaking and
building excitement for it, an entrepreneur may be able to obtain a
package of desired goods at a much lower price than she would be
able to if she sought these various goods unbundled from the others.
Locavesting, while still in its infancy, represents a particularly
intriguing form of bundling as it illustrates the ways that bundling
may be used to promote the creation of goods that are not otherwise
easily funded through private mechanisms. Many individuals today
seem to place genuine value on living in a town with a high number
of small, locally owned businesses or in a region with a vibrant local
economy. Yet, like many public goods, the challenges that regularly
impede collective action may make it difficult for these attributes to
be produced and maintained at the socially optimal level. Bundling
the creation of such goods with capital raising does not overcome the
collective action challenges—even individuals who desire such
public goods might be better off free riding on the efforts of others to
141. Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity:
Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L.
REV. 231, 232–33 (2008).
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support them—but it does provide an innovative way for persons in
the community to support small businesses that might not be viable
otherwise.
The niches where direct finance appears to be taking hold
highlight the ways that nonfinancial innovations may shape the
future of finance. Thanks to improvements in social media, for
example, a person who decides to fund a particular venture or to
support a local undertaking can immediately broadcast that decision
to all of his friends, family, and followers through an array of digital
networks. In such an environment, the ability to couple capital
provision with publicity that enhances the reputation of both funder
and undertaking may well be more efficient than efforts to acquire
these goods outside the capital-raising process, and such bundling
might also enable the expression of preferences and the attainment
of benefits that are not readily conveyed or captured in other
ways. The process of providing capital in the early stages of an
enterprise might also enable funders to feel as though they are part
of the undertaking—shouldering the risks and sharing in the
gains—in a way that was rarely accessible to those with limited
means prior to the rise of Kickstarter and similar platforms.
Juxtaposing this brief examination with the changes that have
occurred in P2P lending suggests that direct finance may be on the
rise, but it is more likely to thrive when one or both parties enjoy
nonpecuniary gains from the transaction. It is along these
nonfinancial dimensions that the presence of individuals, who know
their own idiosyncratic preferences better than any intermediary
and who can provide other information or goods that no
intermediary can readily replicate, is most likely to yield sufficient
value to outweigh the benefits that intermediaries can provide.
The data points examined here are too few and too dynamic to
enable any meaningful conclusions to be drawn about whether and
where direct finance will be viable. Nonetheless, the additional data
available are consistent with the notion that direct finance is more
likely to thrive when the exchange involves something more than a
pure investment. Another successful crowdfunding site, for
example, is Kiva.142 The site works with non-governmental
organizations and other organizations to identify persons across the
globe who may benefit from microloans. Lenders screen the profiles
of would-be borrowers, choose how to allocate their funds, and while
they typically earn their money back, they receive the satisfaction of
knowing that they helped create credit and thereby opportunity for
someone in need in lieu of any interest.143 Similarly, the failure of
142. E.g., Verstein, supra note 33, at 513–17.
143. Id.; see also Natricia Duncan, Crowdfunding Development: ‘Kiva’s Aim
Is to Make Microfinance Easy’, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2014, 6:13 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionalsnetwork/2014/jun/10/crowdfunding-for-development; Scott E. Hartley, Kiva.org:
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P2P equity crowdfunding to take off despite the hype surrounding
the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act does not bode
well for its viability as a mode of financing, unless it can be used to
simultaneously build excitement or provide firms something more
than access to capital.144
B. Policy Implications
The main policy discussions about crowdfunding thus far have
focused on how to enable crowdfunding despite the rigorous
disclosure and other obligations that securities laws typically
impose on any firm that seeks to raise capital from the public.145 As
reflected in the JOBS Act and the SEC’s recently adopted rules,
colloquially known as Regulation A+, there are efforts underway to
facilitate crowdfunding.146 At the same time, it took the SEC years
to promulgate rules implementing the crowdfunding provisions of
the JOBS Act, and experts believe that the crowdfunding allowed
pursuant to the final rules will “only make sense for more
established companies seeking at least several million dollars in
capital.”147
The question of how to appropriately balance the
investor protection concerns, the value of enabling smaller
companies to raise funds directly from the public and the other
issues implicated in current debates about equity crowdfunding,
while far from resolved, have been the subject of extensive and
ongoing discussion among the SEC, academics, and other
commentators.148
The analysis here should contribute to that ongoing discussion.
The SEC and the securities laws it enforces are likely going to
impose frictions on any exchange in which rights that could be
deemed a security are among those provided to parties providing
Crowd-Sourced Microfinance and Cooperation in Group Lending 14–15 (Mar.
2010)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1572182.
144. See supra Subpart II.A.
145. See 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2015).
146 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126
Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see
generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks
and the Securities Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must Be
Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1735 (2012) (discussing
the impact of the JOBS Act on crowdfunding).
147 Daniel Huang, Small Crowds Get Their Day in Investing Sun, WALL STREET
J., June 18, 2015, at C3.
148 See, e.g., Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under
the Securities Act (Regulation A), Exchange Act Release No. 33-9741, 2015 WL
1788375 (Mar. 25, 2015); C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal
Securities Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway
& Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the
Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879 (2011); Andrew A. Schwartz,
Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457 (2013).
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capital, but the speculations here also open up a range of other
potentially interesting policy issues. The trend of uncoupling the
provision of capital from other dimensions of an undertaking not
only affected the evolution of shareholder voting, but also the
evolution of the institutions that evolved to support the capitalraising process. One reason the SEC is already so deeply enmeshed
in these debates is that most capital raising in the United States
now falls under its jurisdiction. Consumer protection issues, by
contrast, are typically addressed by the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”) and state consumer protection laws. And, to the extent the
law plays any role in patronage for the arts and other creative
endeavors, it is typically through contract and state laws enabling
the creation of nonprofit firms.
There is meaningful overlap in the aims animating these
disparate bodies and sources of law. Concerns about fraud, for
example, arise across these different domains and are likely to arise
in connection with direct finance as well. Whenever someone is
giving money today in exchange for promises that will only be
fulfilled at some point in the future, fraud is likely to be a
concern. In addition to being an issue with respect to which
disparate bodies of law likely pursue a common aim, this is also an
area with respect to which the current legal and regulatory scheme
suffices. The FTC, for example, has already gotten involved in this
space when it identified a Kickstarter campaign in which the
entrepreneur used the money received for personal and other
expenses unrelated to the proposed undertaking.149
Yet there are also significant differences in these regimes, the
aims they seek to further, and in the types of benefits cognizable in
each. The notion of market efficiency that animates much of
securities law, for example, has no parallel in the world of patronage
for the arts, and may even seem contrary to the spirit of such
patronage. When the return on an investment thus includes both
economic rights and intrinsic satisfaction, it may become far more
difficult for any single agency or actor to assess and understand the
legitimacy of an exchange.
A related issue is that even with the recent changes
promulgated pursuant to the JOBS Act, these disparate regimes and
the requirements typically imposed on the issuance of anything that
might be deemed a security significantly curtail the types of bundles
entrepreneurs can offer to potential funders. In particular,
entrepreneurs today cannot readily raise capital by offering
packages of rights that include both nonpecuniary benefits of the
types typically offered through Kickstarter and economic rights in
the project that would enable funders to enjoy a portion of the

Rebecca R. Ruizjune, F.T.C. Reaches Settlement in a Kickstarter Scheme,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2015, at B2.
149
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upside should a project prove exceptionally successful. This
limitation may be justified by investor protection concerns and is
likely mitigated somewhat by the capacity for an entrepreneur to
engage in multiple rounds of capital raising from different types of
sources. Nonetheless, there may be projects that could get funded if
there was greater flexibility across these different lines. For
example, a filmmaker who could promise capital providers the
opportunity to be part of the creative process and a sliver of the
upside should the film prove to be exceptionally successful, might be
able to fund a project she could not fund if unable to offer such a
bundle or forced to comply with even the more lenient obligations
imposed by Regulation A+.
Also noteworthy is that the fuzziness between these lines is
creating problems even within the current regulatory scheme. This
is illustrated in funder responses to both extremely successful and
exceptionally unsuccessful Kickstarter-funded projects. When
virtual-reality firm Oculus Rift was acquired by Facebook for $2
billion after raising capital through a Kickstarter campaign and
from venture capitalists, for example, many of the persons who had
provided capital through the Kickstarter campaign were angry that
the venture capitalists enjoyed “20-fold return on their initial
investments” while the Kickstarter funders received nothing more
than the prototypes and other goods they had been promised when
they made their commitments.150 Kickstarter funders who
supported a project to create a new type of espresso machine in
exchange for promises that they would receive the machine once it
went into production similarly rallied together in frustration when
that firm followed a very different trajectory—failing to produce the
promised espresso machines, and then just failing.151 That some
funders are unhappy does not necessarily mean there are issues
that the law should address, but these various voices of discontent
suggest that consumers/investors may be as unfamiliar as
regulators and other policymakers with the new paradigm embodied
in Kickstarter and its kin.
Crowdfunding and new forms of direct finance remain young
and dynamic, making it difficult to foresee how these practices will
evolve and the policy issues that will prove most pressing. Making
it easier for smaller firms to raise capital and otherwise ensuring
that the disclosure and other obligations designed for larger
companies do not excessively stifle the capacity for other types of
firms and entrepreneurs to raise capital from the public may well be
E.g., Jillian Berman, I Backed Oculus Rift on Kickstarter and All I Got Was
This Lousy T-Shirt, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 26, 2015, 10:17 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/26/oculus-riftkickstarter_n_5034511.html.
151 E.g., Gideon Lewis-Kraus, ZPM Espresso and the Rage of the Jilted
Crowdfunder, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 3, 2015, at MM61.
150
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the appropriate focal point for current debate. Nonetheless, the
analysis here does suggest that policy discussions focused solely on
how to expand the scope of firms that can use crowdfunding to raise
capital may miss some of the more interesting policy issues that
direct finance might raise, and may inadvertently curtail the forms
of direct finance most likely to create value that cannot be realized
in other ways. The benefits and drawbacks of exchanges that
bundle equity or debt issuances with nonpecuniary rewards, for
example, are topics that may merit more attention than they have
received thus far. Policymakers may also be better positioned to
gauge the full range of issues at stake in such exchanges if these
issues are explored by multi-disciplinary groups of regulators who
may be attuned to different benefits and challenges.
Conclusion
In contrast to a long-standing trend in the opposite direction,
recent innovations have enabled more direct transacting between
the suppliers and recipients of capital. Many of the social and
technological advances driving this trend in other domains have also
started to transform finance, leading many to hope that we may be
on the dawn of a new era of direct finance. The rapid evolution of
P2P lending suggests that the promise of a world in which
individuals regularly exchange capital among themselves with little
aid from established financial intermediaries is unlikely to be
realized anytime soon. Intermediation chains remain long and
complex, and institutional investors continue to enjoy a number of
regulatory and other advantages over individuals seeking to invest
funds in productive undertakings. Yet there are also indications
that direct finance may yet thrive. Particularly as technology is
harnessed to couple the provision of capital with publicity or other
goods or services, the suppliers and recipients may each derive
additional benefits upon which they place unique subjective
values. Once the exchange takes on these additional dimensions,
the benefits of direct finance may outweigh the other factors that
weigh in favor of longer chains. Ultimately, these gains may be
realized only if regulators are willing to go outside of their comfort
zones and work across agency bounds to understand the benefits
and drawbacks of such bundling.

